There are important parallels between the pattern of inference Kenneth Waltz uses in his Theory of International Politics and early Darwinian reasoning. This early Darwinian thinking has needed to be significantly refined by modern evolutionary biologists, and their amendments are equally relevant to Waltz's model. Waltz allows for states to imitate each other, and also accepts that they are only rarely eliminated from the system. Modern Darwinian analyses show that where elimination is rare and imitation common it is quite possible for deleterious behaviours to become widespread. We cannot assume an anarchic system will select for security-enhancing behaviours in major powers. Thinking about Waltz's argument in these terms opens space to disagree with his conclusions while respecting the strength of his logic.
Introduction
In his conclusion to Realism and World Politics 1 , Booth develops an analogy between the work of Kenneth Waltz and Charles Darwin. There are further fundamental parallels between the two which he leaves unexplored. Both propose models of how selection within complex systems causes the units to converge on certain kinds of behaviour. Darwin shows that most of the animals 2 we see around us have physical characteristics, and instincts, which are almost ideally suited to surviving in their environments because members of past generations which were poorly adapted did not survive and reproduce 3 . Waltz predicts that major players in the international system will behave in ways which are suited to surviving in anarchy 4 . In Darwin's model, units which do not conform with the constraints of the selective system are either eliminated or fail to reproduce. In Waltz's model, the major powers show relatively little variation in their behaviours in the present because they too are the survivors of competition among units in the past. But both rely on assumptions about how selective systems would have shaped the population of units which constituted them in the past. Both involve assumptions about how selection in the present will shape that population in the future.
These two thinkers are giants in their fields, and for good reason. However, both of their models have been criticised for capturing only part of reality. Over the course of the twentieth century neo-Darwinian biologists have refined, and in some cases rejected, elements of Darwin's own thinking, while retaining his central insights. The parallels between Waltz's reasoning and Darwin's mean that some of these critiques may also be helpful in refining Waltz's 'neorealist' approach to international relations. Clarifying the parallels allows us to tap into over a hundred years of biological thinking on Darwin's legacy 5 .
In this paper I examine Waltz's underlying argument that significant states will tend to behave prudently, and draw some parallels with how Darwinians reason about biological evolution. Waltz argues that diversity of states' behaviour is reduced partly by elimination.
States which behaved inappropriately in the past were likely to "fall by the wayside" 6 and were either conquered or relegated from geopolitical significance (like Austria or Sweden).
Their nonconformist behaviours followed them. However, Waltz's argument cannot rest on elimination alone. He appears to rely on the impact of a few eliminations being multiplied by their exemplary effect, which causes surviving states to imitate the behaviour of their most successful competitors, further reducing the variety of behaviours present among significant states 7 . Yet Darwin's modern successors have shown that this kind of imitation may not automatically make a selective system evolve, because it imports the inherent weaknesses of what evolutionary theorists call a Lamarckian model. I argue that the system Waltz describes cannot enforce prudent behaviour by itself unless states are guided by policy prescriptions which themselves seem distinctly neorealist.
Darwin and Theories of International Politics
Darwin's name carries a great deal of unfair baggage in the social sciences, which may conceal the usefulness of modern Darwinian thought 8 . I should make clear at the outset that this is not an argument about human nature and that I am not claiming that Waltz appeals directly to Darwin -although there is an indirect link between them.
There is an established tradition of using Darwin's ideas in international relations theoryor more accurately there are two radically different traditions, which conveniently fall into two of Waltz's "images" of international politics 9 . Darwin's name and Darwinian reasoning have been used explicitly to justify claims about human nature, providing "first image"
explanations for the pattern of international relations. For example, Thayer 10 claims that
Darwinian ideas can bolster the classical-realist contention that human nature is incompatible with global co-operation, a claim based on the belief that we can extrapolate from the challenges humans have faced in our evolutionary history to our modern behaviour 11 .
Darwin's ideas have been used more often to support generalisations about human nature than to analyse the evolution of relations among states, despite the logical difficulties of generalising about individuals and a compelling intellectual case for analysing the evolution of state systems in Darwinian terms 12 . When I discuss Darwinian ideas in this paper I am not really thinking about the "first image" implications of Darwinian thought but about "third image" uses of quasi-Darwinian ideas.
The "third image" concerns the complex system which emerges from interaction among states. This system both shapes, and is shaped by, individual states' behaviour 13 . The dominant traditions in the field characterise this system as anarchic. Darwinian theory offers a particular way of reasoning about how units in a selective system are likely to behave. Units whose behaviour is compatible with the environment will tend to leave more descendents, which will resemble them more than their competitors.
Therefore, compatible behaviours will become ever more common and incompatible ones ever rarer. Many Darwinians have argued that under many circumstances competition among units is likely to cause an approximation of 'rational' behavior to emerge. For example, optimal foraging theory suggests that foraging animals' behavior will converge around strategies which tend to offer the greatest calorie yield per hour of effort 28 . Inefficient foragers will be more likely to die before reproducing, and so with each generation foraging becomes more efficient -or would, were the environment not also in a constant state of flux.
The numerical superiority of the well-adapted units will enable them to dominate the selective system itself, thus changing the selective environment faced by units in the future.
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz allows that in principle states' behaviours could vary. However, he also sees them as constrained by selection, and goes on to argue that we can identify certain behaviours which are better-suited to states' environment, international
anarchy. These will be the behaviours which preserve states' security. States whose behaviours do not preserve their security will "fall by the wayside" and no longer be in a position to shape the international system. Because this has been the case for centuries now, we can expect that the international system of the present will be shaped by security-seeking states 29 .
Waltz reasons that, over time, most of the major states will converge around a particular pattern of behaviours. He further implies that we can deduce which behaviours are likely to be favoured by the system, and anticipate that those behaviours will be widespread. The widespread behaviours generate a neorealist international system, which punishes states which do not conform to that pattern of behaviour. This is worth examining in more detail, because it implies that the distribution of behaviours is key to understanding the system.
Structural Realism as Behaviour Selection
Waltz argues that behaviours which make the state exhibiting them more likely to survive in anarchy tend to become more common over time, until eventually they become ubiquitous among the states that matter. For a Realist, of course, the behaviour which is almost always rewarded by anarchy is the pursuit and preservation of power. Waltz, a defensive neorealist, infers that the system is most likely to favour behaviours which enhance power only up until the point at which that state's increasing power starts to become actively harmful to its security, by provoking conflict with fearful neighbours 30 . He expects the behaviours common among the major powers to be those which are correlated with the retention of an optimum level of power, at which the states are most secure.
Waltz reasons that two consequences of anarchy will lead to security-enhancing behaviours becoming ubiquitous. The first is elimination, the second, "socialisation" 31 . Both of these have parallels in Darwinian thought.
Elimination in Theory of International Politics
In principle, sovereign states could behave in a range of different ways. Not all of these will improve their odds of self-preservation. The states which dominate the present will be those which were selected by the international system in the past. In the past there will have been a range of states, some of which behaved in ways that preserved their power, some of which did not. Over time states whose behaviour leads to a loss of relative power will be more likely to be conquered or relegated from major power status; they "fall by the wayside" 32 .
Therefore, states which are significant in the international system today will have been concerned to preserve their power in the past, and are more likely than not to behave in ways which preserve their power in the present. This behaviour should enable them to preserve their position in the system. Elimination in its literal sense does not by itself explain why major powers' behaviour should converge so strongly. While unquestionably states are sometimes violently eliminated from the system, Waltz accepts that, empirically, this is quite infrequent, an objection raised by Robert Keohane in the 1980s 33 . This is a crucial point of departure from microeconomics, where the "death rate" for firms is much higher 34 Finally, Waltz stresses that neorealist theory alone cannot, and need not, predict foreign policy:
Just as market theory at times requires a theory of the firm, so international-political theory at times needs a theory of the state 35 If anarchy selected only by eliminating and relegating non-conformist states, drawing a conclusion that states will behave prudently from these observations would seem odd. This passage seems to imply both that processes which occur outside of the model might increase diversity of behaviours and that the system will be slow to check this diversity. Waltz does not set out to explain how foreign policy is generated. He therefore allows foreign policy to be generated outside of the model (presumably within the states themselves), and allows that states are free to choose their foreign policies. For example, in his earlier work Waltz provided a comparative analysis of how British Prime Ministers and American Presidents direct their countries' respective foreign policies which emphasised the influence of those countries' party systems 36 , a factor which clearly falls outside his neorealist theory. Because they are generated outside of the model, these policies need not necessarily conform with the logic of the system. In other words, foreign policy-making processes could increase the diversity of behaviours among the states which constitute the system. The status quo is always (according to Waltz) dominated by prudent states. If foreign policy generation were not constrained by his theory, then Waltz would give us no reason to believe that imprudent policies will not be generated as well as prudent ones. Given that the existing states are (according to Waltz) almost all going to be behaving prudently, any increase in diversity is likely to reduce the average level of prudent behaviour. If elimination of non-conformist states were the only force in Waltz's model, then diversity of behaviours would be reduced only by the fact that non-conformist states tend to be destroyed or to become so weak that their behaviour becomes irrelevant to the system as a whole. The rate of elimination would need to be high enough that imprudent behaviours could not proliferate faster than the system sanctioned them.
An analogy may help to clarify. States' foreign policy-making has a place in Waltz's model similar to the place of genetic mutation and sexual recombination in Darwin's.
among animals on which selection can act, they are absolutely fundamental to explaining evolution 37 . Genetic mutations and sexual recombination are not explained by evolutionary theory. They occur as a result of chemical processes at the genetic level, of which Darwin himself was of course completely unaware. He simply observed that there was change in animals' characteristics with each new generation, and did not attempt to explain why. This change, while not exactly random in a statistical sense, could not be predicted by the theory and so might as well be treated as random for the purposes of his argument because it was not predicted by any other factor he could account for. By taking the occurrence of random variation for granted, Darwin was able to concentrate on explaining how natural selection constricts this variation and keeps populations of animals well-adapted to their environmenteven if that environment changes slowly over time. This created a viable theory when the mechanics of heredity were not fully understood.
By the same token, it is not necessarily unreasonable for Waltz to simply accept that foreign policies are made by forces outside of the neorealist framework and then explain how the international-political system limits their diversity 38 . In fact, he has argued vigorously that he does not need a theory of foreign policy.
However, if foreign policies are exogenously-generated and elimination is rare then elimination alone cannot explain convergence around security-enhancing behaviours. If the only force constraining diversity acts more slowly than the force increasing it, then obviously diversity will increase. And it would seem that foreign policymaking would be likely to increase diversity, if only because it would be difficult for the behaviour of great powers to become any more homogenously prudent than Waltz's portrait of the status quo. Thus, a
force external to the model is increasing diversity, and elimination of imprudent states is reducing it. But because elimination is rare, it can only slowly reduce the diversity of behaviours. Foreign policy-making could well increase diversity faster.
Consider this analogy. We know that rabbits can be born black, brown or white, because pet rabbits come in all three colours. These represent three different mutations of the gene which controls fur pigmentation. In temperate climates, we can predict that almost all wild rabbits will be brown. The reason, obviously, is that brown rabbits are less conspicuous to predators. Brown is the prudent colour for a wild rabbit to be. While mutations can easily generate white and black rabbits, we never see them because they are much more likely to be eaten than brown rabbits. But this is only because the mutation rate is relatively low and the death rate is high. If the average rabbit had five white and five brown offspring, and on average one brown offspring and two white offspring were eaten every generation, there could still be many white rabbits in the wild. In the short term mutation and natural selection work in opposition to each other, one increasing diversity of fur colour and one reducing it.
The relative speeds of mutation and selection are important in determining how diverse the population is.
If behaviours do converge, this implies that either elimination reduces diversity of behaviours faster than other factors increase it (unlikely), or that elimination is not the only force causing behaviours to converge. And, of course, it is not. 'Socialisation' of states into the international system appears to be more important in explaining convergence around prudent, security-oriented behaviours. His observation that elimination is relatively rare emphasises the importance of "socialisation" in Waltz's model. This imitative process is absolutely pivotal, because Waltz cannot predict convergence on prudent behaviours without it -and without prudent behaviour by most influential states in the system all the consequences of prudence, including the balance of power, do not follow. Allowing for states to imitate may appear, superficially, to compensate for the slow rate of elimination in international politics compared with economics or biology. Socialation is much quicker than the elimination, and so it appears as if behaviours might converge even when elimination is infrequent 40 . The educational example of seeing only a few states which paid too little attention to their security dismembered should motivate others to adopt prudent, security-oriented behaviours. If Waltz's states perceive their behaviours to be making them less secure they can change them before they become so badly damaged that they have become irrelevant to the system. Thus, Waltz's model includes natural selection in the system but also allows for states to identify and converge on successful strategies through imitation. Imitation creates a simple one-way transfer. Waltz's concept of "socialisation" is a more fluid, dynamic process 41 .
When most of the states imitate, this takes on a reciprocal dimension which adds fluidity the system. By innovating, Prussia gave its competitors an incentive to innovate, and was briefly a 'role model'. But when its neighbours adopted staff systems this changed the selective environment faced by Prussia itself. Now it faced a new environment, and had it reverted to its old pattern of military bureaucracy it would have faced serious danger. International politics developed a kind of self-generating motion characteristic of a Darwinian system.
Socialisation is therefore much more than just imitation, but imitation is a necessary ingredient.
Waltz's structural theory of international politics is therefore in tension with evolution driven primarily by natural selection, which most modern biologists see as the main driver most of the time. If animals are born into a world for which their inherited traits are ill-suited, they cannot learn new traits to save themselves 42 Identifying which behaviours are prudent is far from a simple task. Consider the information necessary to a security-seeking state. Leaders may well wish to imitate a more successful rival. Presumably if they wish to imitate a successful rival they would wish to copy the behaviours responsible for that success. But there is ample literature on the difficulties of predicting whether a policy, or institution, will transfer successfully into a new institutional context 45 . Strategies which work well in some circumstances may fail in others, and predicting which contexts will prove compatible is notoriously difficult. For example, the staff system which influenced states' behaviour in wartime (by determining who made the strategic decisions, such as the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan) did not operate in a vacuum, but had to interact with the military recruitment and even the education systems of the adopting states to produce/select effective military planners. Mistaken imitation is therefore a very real possibility. Ideas which worked for the Prussians might not work so well in a different institutional context. Imitated behaviours may not be compatible with other strategies to which the imitator is committed.
The nature of socialisation in Waltz's model also adds a temporal element to this uncertainty. Behaviours which helped one state become secure in the past could be disastrous given a change in circumstances. Because socialisation is a fluid process, and each state's behaviour affects the others' environment, the selective pressure a state faces changes over time. Therefore, what is prudent is to some extent in flux. Given the difficulty of predicting which behaviours and institutions will be most effective, states will probably make the wrong choices as often as the right ones.
It therefore seems improbable that states can reliably identify behaviours which will enhance their security in advance. This implies that either socialisation generates its own equilibrium, according to its own logic, or that states are able to react to constant feedback from the system.
One possibility is that the process of socialisation itself determines which behaviours are appropriate, according to its own logic. This is a possibility because socialisation is reciprocal. It is conceivable that a fashion for imitating a particular behaviour could create a selective environment which is actually favourable to that behaviour, making units which exhibit it more likely to survive, prosper, and be imitated 46 . If the appropriateness of a behaviour depends on the other units' behaviour, then behaviours which are compatible with each other could become sustainable because other states are socialised into them. For an evolutionary analogy, consider the magnificent plumage of a male pheasant. This is often a liability to males. There is no 'objective' reason females should prefer plumage. But once enough females do prefer it, females who choose not to are at a disadvantage. Their sons will be less likely to inherit plumage, less likely to attract mates, and less likely to provide grandchildren. Such self-generating dynamics are common in Darwinian systems 47 . A fashion for plumage in males, even if it was eccentric when it began, could become selfreinforcing.
While this is one possibility, it does not seem to be what Waltz has in mind. For one thing, he is keen to stress the eternal relevance of neorealist prescriptions. If the appropriateness of behaviours were contingent on imitation and fashions, they could not be so eternal as he suggests. It would also be extremely difficult for an analyst to deduce which behaviours were likely to be favoured from his model.
The alternative is that states are able to react to constant feedback on their security situation gathered from the environment, and will adjust their behaviour to compensate.
While elimination and relegation of powers to insignificance is relatively rare, Waltz seems to have something less dramatic in mind when he says that states 'wax and wane'. States' relative power may change over time. Intuitively, we would expect that states can react to diminution of their power short of elimination, treating this as a sign that their behaviours will, in the long run, increase their odds of evisceration in the future. Their competitors might also be dissuaded from imitating them. But would this constitute reliable feedback to which Waltz's states would necessarily react?
Again, this would be far from unproblematic. Firstly, states cannot necessarily assume a linear relationship between power and security. Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany both reached the peaks of their power immediately before their security was dramatically undermined. The belief that more power can sometimes lead to less security defines Waltz's defensive neorealism. Accordingly, states need some way of knowing whether powerenhancing behaviours pose a threat to their own security. More profoundly, however, if there is a possibility of imitating other states' imprudent behaviours then modern Darwinian theory suggests that the system will not provide the kind of feedback needed for states to choose the most prudent behaviours.
To understand why, we need to consider why Darwin's competition-based theory of evolution dominates biology. Darwinian selection is needed to generate the kind of feedback which will lead the units in a system to converge on behaviours appropriate to their environment. Unfortunately, Waltz's concept of socialisation seems to have more in common with the 'Lamarckian' view of selection, which cannot.
Lamarck's Feedback Problem
Natural selection was not the first superficially-plausible explanation which had been offered to explain evolution. In 1809, the year Darwin was born, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck published his theory to explain how evolution could occur without God constantly intervening to create new species. Lamarck is well-known for the premise on which his theory was based, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, now colloquially called 'Lamarckism' 48 . Analysts who stress the role of ideas and norms in shaping states' behaviour have tended (implicitly or explicitly) to argue that the transmission of ideas between states is Lamarckian 49 . If
Lamarckian inheritance were viable, this might mean that socialisation and elimination would point in the same direction. States would react to feedback from the system reducing their security by constantly learning. Unfortunately, Lamarckian transmission would almost certainly not be able to provide that kind of feedback.
The distinction between Darwin's theory of natural selection and Lamarck's inheritance of acquired characteristics is easily explained using the evolution of the giraffe as an example.
Giraffes have long necks which allow them to eat leaves from the tops of tall trees. The fossil record shows that giraffes descend from an ancestor species which did not have the giraffe's long neck 50 . A Lamarckian explanation would be that members of the ancestor species developed a habit of feeding on the highest leaves of very tall trees, and as a result were constantly stretching their necks. The repeated stretching would slightly lengthen the neck of each successive generation, and each generation would (somehow) pass on this acquired characteristic to its offspring. Over time, the habit of stretching for high leaves would greatly change the shape of giraffe-ancestors' necks.
Darwin's new mechanism of natural selection removed the need to believe that characteristics which giraffe-ancestors acquired during their lifetime could be passed on to their offspring directly. Giraffes' ancestors would produce offspring with necks of varying lengths. The offspring with the longest necks would be better able to feed from the tops of trees, where there was abundant food. The offspring with shorter necks would have to compete for leaves on the lower branches, and in the face of this competition would be more likely to starve to death or to be undernourished and weak 51 . On average, they would be less able to reproduce or to care for their offspring and thus would have fewer descendents than their long-necked relatives. Many would quite literally "fall by the wayside", collapsing and probably being devoured by scavengers. The long-necked giraffe-ancestors would tend to produce offspring which shared the same long necks 52 , until eventually a new long-necked species (which humans would call "the giraffe") evolved.
Today, of course, we know that Darwin's principle of natural selection offers a superior explanation for biological evolution. Not only do they copy, but they copy learning from the copying of others. We can see from the world around us that evolution is not a random process, but one which leads to animals remaining well-suited to their environments even as those environments change. In order to explain why this occurs, any theory of evolution needs some means of distinguishing between beneficial and injurious characteristics. Many if not most changes which occur in animals' bodies will result from injuries. Animals may tone up especially useful muscles, but they also break their teeth and sometimes bones. A theory based on natural selection very clearly defines injurious characteristics -an injurious characteristic is one which reduces an animal's odds of leaving offspring. If acquired characteristics are inherited, then injuries can influence which characteristics an animal leaves to its offspring just as much as any other environmental influence which may affect its lifestyle.
Suppose a giraffe-ancestor fell and permanently damaged the bones in one leg. In order to continue to walk, it would need to distribute its weight differently among its muscles. Even if its offspring were somehow born with all their bones intact (and as Hodgson and Knudsen point out, Lamarckian accounts tend to be vague on why offspring do not inherit fractures or age-related health problems) the pattern of use and disuse of muscles would still be inherited.
If this pattern of muscle strength were only compatible with walking in a distorted posture, then that posture would be inherited and the offspring would hobble inefficiently from tree to tree. Only the possibility of natural selection can distinguish this as an injury by killing off giraffe-ancestors which inherited it. If there were no natural selection in the system, modifications which resulted from injuries would quickly become ubiquitous -since most adults which live long enough to reproduce acquire some injuries along the way. A hobbling giraffe-ancestor in a Lamarckian world could beget many hobbling offspring if it had easy access to food and a low probability of encountering a predator. Only the fact that life for the ancestors of real giraffes was tough, with regular predation and shortages of food and potential mates, explains why the modern giraffe became so ideally-suited to its niche within the ecological system. Waltz's model of the international political system cannot show us why states cannot similarly tend to retain traits which are suboptimal for their survival.
As Hodgson and Knudsen put it:
Prominent cases of acquired characteristics include injuries and other impairments. But, for species to evolve, the effects of such deleterious acquired characteristics must be restricted. Giving serious thought to the implications of Lamarckian inheritance quickly reveals that, unless we are to impute some magical drive to perfection to units in a selective system 60 , it needs rapid selection to explain units' consistent movement towards characteristics and behaviours well-suited to their environments. Given the difficulty of identifying beneficial behaviours in advance, regular elimination of failing units is needed to distinguish good inheritances from bad inheritances 61 . In other words, even if there is the possibility of Lamarckian inheritance, some form of elimination ends up doing all the work which causes convergence on traits that are suited to the environment. Without natural selection, Lamarckism would spread traits almost randomly. Therefore, imitation of the successful by their rivals is unlikely to be sufficient to make states converge on prudent, security-enhancing behaviours which are as timeless as Waltz suggests.
Waltz's model seems to explain convergence of behaviours by combining a slow rate of natural selection with the rapid imitation of strategies which appear to have been successful elsewhere. Unfortunately, in order for natural selection to explain why units in the present would converge on particular behaviours, units in the past would need to have been subjected to a high degree of selective pressure. Units which existed in the past and were well-suited to their environment would need to exert a very strong influence on how states which exist in the present behave; the characteristics of states which did not conform to the logic of anarchy would need to be quickly removed from the system. The international system, however, combines the possibility of imitating injurious behaviours with a low "death rate". The
Lamarckian nature of socialisation suggests divergence from strategies which are objectively well-suited to anarchy, the strategies we might be able to predict by reasoning about the behaviour of states in an idealised system. Harmful behaviours may be imitated. Because imitation is quick, imprudent behaviours can spread much more quickly than the elimination and relegation of imitating states by more-successful competitors can keep them in check.
Taking account of the quasi-Lamarckian dimension to Waltz's model actually emphasises the importance of elimination in causing systematic convergence of behaviours. If animals could inherit acquired characteristics, both characteristics useful to the parents during their lifetime and characteristics which result from injuries could be inherited. By the same token, if states can imitate each others' novel institutions and behaviours they might acquire useful tools for ensuring their security, but they might also imitate those which will turn out to be harmful to the imitated state in the future. The useful characteristics are by definition those which will enhance the unit's chances of surviving at its current position in the system, so it is crucial to be able to distinguish one from the other. When we combine the possibility of Lamarckian inheritance with natural selection, only natural selection checks the spread of injurious characteristics and behaviours. If the rate of natural selection is low, this check becomes less effective. If it is low enough (in other words, if survival is easy enough even when a unit's characteristics are suboptimal) acquired injuries may be passed on to new generations faster than they can be eliminated.
Simply stating that the units are parts of a competitive system 62 does not, therefore, tell us how they are likely to behave unless we follow it with more assumptions about the nature of resulting units showing a wide range of behaviours from extreme egoism to altruism. There are many ideas in evolutionary theory which might be significant for international politics.
Among the most obviously relevant to this discussion are ideas building on William
Hamilton's and Richard Dawkins' work, culminating in the popular theory that genes act as the primary units of selection ('selfish gene' theory'). This challenges head-on the idea that a selective system will lead to self-preserving behaviours becoming ubiquitous.
Alternative Outcomes of Selection
Writing in the nineteenth century, Darwin was unaware that characteristics are inherited through discrete genes 63 . As a result, he tended to focus on competition among individual animals to survive and reproduce. In the early twentieth century, Darwinian thought was transformed by a synthesis with the genetic theory of inheritance. Modern Darwinism acknowledges competition among units for survival and reproductive opportunities, but evolution can often be better understood as competition among individual genes for expression within a population. Richard Dawkins' work has been hugely important in popularising the idea that the behaviours which spread a gene will not always be those which preserve the body it is currently inhabiting: there are many situations in which the selective pressures on individual genes and on whole animals diverge. In those situations, the interests of the genes take priority 64 .
In the same way, Waltz's Theory of International Politics can be read better as an account of why particular behaviours 65 are widespread among major powers than an account of why the USA and USSR were major powers. His system punishes and rewards states, but the consequence of this is to encourage the spread of self-regarding behaviours at the expense of other behaviours. Modern Darwinians can often explain animal evolution better by seeing the natural world as an arena in which genes compete against each other, and the victors become widespread in the population (the "gene's-eye view" 66 ). In other words, genes and behaviours, not animals and states, are the units of selection.
Even though modern Darwinian biologists, like neorealists, see the world as an anarchic arena in which competing strategies are tested against each other and the characteristics of the winners proliferate, they do not assume that this leads to convergence on self-regarding behaviour. In fact, genes which are actively harmful to the survival prospects of the animal which carries them can and do proliferate. Worker bees will sacrifice themselves for their nestmates; salmon swim upstream to their deaths every mating season. These behaviours perpetuate the genes which cause them even while destroying the body they are currently inhabiting 67 . Treating the gene as the unit of selection, the only criterion for success is that more copies of that gene exist in the future than did in the past. The fate of the individual, mortal animal which hosts a gene temporarily is largely irrelevant 68 . For example, modern
Darwinism can explain why individual animals, such as worker bees which serve the queens rather than breeding themselves, will sacrifice their own reproductive capacities and often their lives for others; due to a quirk of insect genetics, worker bees get more copies of their own genes into future generations of bees by caring for their sisters' offspring than they would by breeding themselves 69 . Time and again, the evidence has shown that the traits which become widespread in animals are not necessarily those which preserve the animals that carry them, but rather those which make those animals produce more copies of the trait.
Logically, this should apply to selective systems in general; the traits widespread in the present will be those which were successful in being disseminated in the past. 
Conclusion
Modern Darwinians argue convincingly that we can expect units in a selective system to converge on the behaviours best-suited to the environment only if units carrying inappropriate traits are systematically less likely to reproduce. Waltz concedes that states are rarely eliminated from the system, and even the relegation of states from great power status to the lower divisions is not common. This makes distinguishing problematic behaviours difficult. If states can acquire deleterious characteristics through imitation faster than the system punishes them, it is entirely possible for deleterious traits to spread. Waltz's model cannot show us that states' behaviour will automatically converge around the best means to security unless unsuccessful states risk being eliminated, or relegated from the ranks of the major powers with which his theory is concerned, faster than they can be imitated.
Biologists have observed many empirical cases of behaviours which risk animals' lives yet which still appear to be favoured by the system. This can occur whenever the increased odds of a given trait being copied into other units outweigh harm to its current host. Waltz's model does not, by itself, show why the same could not be true in the international political system.
If the system eliminates/relegates non-conformist states more slowly than states can imitate each other, they may converge on imprudent behaviours. While we might be able to deduce how states would ideally maintain their security, we do not have an obvious way to predict how imprudent imitation might lead them to diverge from this ideal.
There has been extensive discussion in the pages of this journal of Waltz's metatheoretical position 71 . A selective system on its own cannot cause its units to converge on prudent behaviours unless there is a high death rate. This does not mean that imprudence does not sometimes lead to suffering. It is possible that imprudent behaviours will spread even though they sometimes lead to suffering. Behaviours might seem appealing, and be widely imitated, even if they are bad for the survival prospects of the state that imitates them. Anarchy does not preclude this. If the system is left to follow its natural course, imprudent behaviours may spread faster than the system can feed back that they are imprudent.
There is also a human dimension. Waltz's model has many Darwinian characteristics, but there is more going on. A fundamentalist Darwinian understanding of the world generates its own rationality. All that matters is the spread of traits, and a good trait is a 'fit' trait, one which gets itself copies into future generations of hosts. There is no need to assume that the units start out as rational actors, because the system is self-regulating in a particularly brutal way. The ecological system eliminates genes that are not good at getting their hosts to make more copies of them, until it is filled with animals carrying genes that are good at getting themselves copied. A curious kind of rationality emerges from such a system, where all that matters is replication. In principle we could, with enough information and imagination, predict how animals will behave by calculating what behaviours would be most likely to get their genes copied. To some extent we do this all the time. Pet owners can safely predict that their animals will pursue food and sex and avoid pain: thinking through the logic of this, they are in effect reasoning that pets will do the things that increase their chances of leaving offspring in the wild. Waltz could be interpreted as implying that the international-political system has its own internally-generated rationality of survival 72 Waltz -unlike a biologist -has the option of trying to find the course which will minimise human suffering and persuading units to follow it.
Encouraging states to behave like rational power-seekers might have positive consequences. Waltz's model simply does not show that they will do so if left alone to interact. Thus, the normative commitment takes on greater importance. We need not interpret
Theory of International Politics as a positive model of how the world must be. States could choose to heed the siren calls to imitate imprudent policies, and the system could not prevent them. I suggest that, for Waltz, this is the whole point of pleading with them not to. 
